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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
not, however, a unique holding.24 There are several other ways in which the same
result could have been reached with equal aplomb and support of the authorities.
Most of the cases which have found that options violate the rule against per-
petuities, including the progenitor of all such decisions, 2 have involved options
which by their terms were inheritable or assignable, and therefore, likely to en-
dure far too long.26 But where the option is simply given to a named party and
no time limit is specified, it has been frequently held that the option is presump-
tively personal and cannot extend beyond some life in being, namely the option
holder himself,27 although it is not so clear that a lifetime option would not con-
stitute an unreasonable restraint of alienation. There is some authority for the
proposition that options are to be considered an exception to the rule against
perpetuities.2 s In a few other cases it has been held that an option is either not
an interest in land,29 or is a presently vested interest,30 both of which conclusions
will avoid the rule. At least one court seems to have allowed an option to stand
on the express basis of social utility,3 1 whereas others have concluded that an
option is not an absolute restraint to alienation and, therefore, not within the
intent of the rules.32 Finally, there are a number of decisions in which the question
has been ignored entirely.2 3
The rule against perpetuities has demonstrated all of the indestructable peren-
nial tenacity of crab grass, in spite of almost continual attack.34 It seems then,
that its existence must be endured at least for the time being. The Mattern case
doubtless is not the herald of a new trend, but it does clearly show the danger in
the use of options in which a time limit has not been unambiguously asserted. It
is, in addition, further authority for the salvage of options improvidently drawn.
John W. Beatty
CRIMINAL LAW - CONFESSIONS - REAFFIRMATION OF INADMISSIBLE CON-
FESSION ALSO HELD INADMISSIBLE. - Killough, arrested on suspicion of mur-
dering his wife, signed a confession before being taken, some thirty-four hours
following the arrest, before a committing magistrate. Following arraignment, he
orally reaffirmed the written confession. The federal trial court held the first
confession inadmissible under the Mallory rule,' which requires the automatic ex-
24 E.g., Saraceno v. Carrano, 92 Conn. 563, 103 Ad. 631 (1918); In re Champion's
Estate, 15 N.Y. Supp. 768 (1890).
25 London & South Western Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. Div. 562 (1882).
26 See, e.g., Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 Ad. 312 (1914); Skeen v. Clinchfield Coal
Co., 137 Va. 397, 119 S.E.89 (1923); Starcher Bros. v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 373, 56 S.E. 524
(1907).
27 E.g., Alamo School Dist. v. Jones, 182 Cal. App. 2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960);
Weitzmann v. Weitzmann, 87 Ind. App. 236, 161 N.E. 385 (1928); Campbell v. Campbell, 313
Ky. 249, 230 S.W.2d 918.
28 In re Water Front on Upper N.Y. Bay, 246 N.Y. 1, 157 N.E. 911 (1927).
29 Dodd v. Rotterman, 330 Il. 362, 161 N.E. 756 (1928); Koegh v. Peck, 316 Ill. 318,
147 N.E. 266 (1925); Mineral Land Investment Co. v. Bishop Iron Co., 134 Minn. 412, 159
N.W. 966 (1916).
30 People's St. Ry. v. Spencer, 156 Pa. 85, 27 AU. 113 (1893); Wall v. Minneapolis, St. P.
& S.S.M. Ry., 86 Wis. 48, 56 N.W. 367 (1893).
31 Gale v. York Center Community Cooperative, Inc., 21 Ill.2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30 (1961).
32 Buck v. Walker, 115 Minn. 239, 132 N.W. 205 (1911); Epstein v. Belovsky, 233 N.Y.
524, 135 N.E. 902 (1922).
33 Daly v. Daly, 299 Ill. 268, 132 N.E. 495 (1921); Hornaday v. Hornaday, 229 N.C. 164,
47 S.E.2d 857 (1948).
34 See, Berg, Long Term Options and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 1,
235, 419 (1949); Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65
HARV. L. REv. 721 (1952).
1 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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clusion in federal trials of any inculpatory expression obtained during an illegal
detention, but accepted the second on the basis of its voluntariness.2 Subsequently
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, held: Manslaughter
conviction reversed. The oral reaffirmation of the day-old confession obtained from
the defendant without representation by counsel was inadmissible in a federal
trial. Killough v. United States, 315 F. 2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
Contrary to the prediction of one authority, who felt that the abnormal ex-
pansion of the exclusionary principle during the nineteenth century would be
followed by a period of deep reaction,3 the Killough decision marks a further ex-
tension of that principle. Until the 1943 ruling in McNabb v. United States,4
federal courts had looked upon confessions through the acid tests of voluntariness
or trustworthiness, which became in time indistinguishable, rendering academic
the inability of historians to agree as to the historically accurate one.5 Until then,
no distinction was drawn between confessions obtained prior to arraignment and
those obtained after.6 The McNabb holding, embryo to that finally crystallized in
Mallory, marked the initial instance of a c6nfession's inadmissibility being based
upon the illegal detention during which it was obtained. Because of that Court's
preoccupation with the other forms of coercion exerted in that case, however, the
rule did not reach the maturity of automaticity until further expounded in Upshaw
v. United States,' in which the criterion of the detention's illegality became Rule
5(a) s of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure," and, finally, in Mallory. The
rule, in its adult form, demanded the exclusion, regardless of whether or not
coerced, of any confession procured during an illegal detention unless the delay
in commitment occurred after the incriminating statement.1 0 But the Court in those
cases emphasized that such exclusions are not Constitutionally-based n' but stem
from that Court's inherent supervisory power over lower federal courts and federal
law enforcement officers, enabling it to set, within its discretion, desirable ad-
missibility standards without legislation.12 The Mallory rule, then, and its Killough
extension, are not applicable to state proceedings, wherein, to effect exclusion, the
Court must still resort to the minimal standard of the Fourteenth Amendment,
set out in Brown v. Mississippi,1s and a long line of succeeding cases.14 The sug-
gestion has been made, however, that commitment without unnecessary delay might
soon be held to be a due process requirement.'5
2 United States v. Killough, 193 F. Supp. 905 (D.D.C. 1961).
3 3 WIGMORE, EvmENcE § 817 (3d ed. 1940).
4 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
5 INBAU & REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 198 (3d ed. 1953).
6 72 YALE L.J. 1434, 1437-38 (1963).
7 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
8 FED. R CaRn. P. 5 (a):
Appearance before the Commissioner - An officer making an arrest
under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest
without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay
before the nearest available commissioner or before any other nearby officer
empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the
United States. When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before
a commissioner or other officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith.
9 Supra note 6, at 1440.
10 United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
11 McNabb v. United States, supra note 3, at 340.
12 INBAU & REID, op. cit. supra note 5, at 199.
13 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
14 E.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958);
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426 (1958); Pikes v..
Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Gallegos v. Nebraska,
342 U.S. 55 (1951); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
15 FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS 178 (1958). MCCORMICK, EvmENCE 250
(1954).
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There are, then, two classes of confessions which a federal court will clearly
exclude: those found to have been coerced, and those ipso facto inadmissible be-
cause acquired during a period of illegal detention. The reaffirmation of a con-
fession of the former class presents, theoretically at least, little difficulty since it is
to be judged by the very same criterion as the first, namely, its voluntariness, 6
although the coercion employed in obtaining the initial disclosure is to be con-
sidered along with all other circumstances.' 7 Hence such reaffirmations have been
deemed acceptable unless found to have been involuntary by their own circum-
stances or so intimately related to the reaffirmed confessions as to be inseparable
therefrom.
1 8
The significance of the Killough decision is that the reaffirmation was excluded
not due to a link with a coerced confession but with one excluded by Mallory,
although, it is true, the situation had been faced before. In United States v. Bayer, 9
the Supreme Court, assuming the first confession inadmissible under McNabb
although it was never actually introduced at the trial, held the reaffirmation
voluntary and therefore admissible, yet conceded that:
[A]fter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no
matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological
and practical disadvantage of having confessed. He can never get the cat
back in the bag. The secret is out for good. In such a sense, a later confes-
sion always may be looked upon as fruit of the first.
20
The Killough majority was able to dismiss Bayer's holding in a footnote, remarking
that the six-month lapse between the two confessions in Bayer makes its inapplica-
bility to Killough "obvious,"' 21 while a dissenter argued for admissibility a fortiori
since in Killough the magistrate's warnings were even fresher in the accused's
mind.22 A third stand on this point, and perhaps the most convincing, was set out
in a concurring opinion which observed that, in any event, "Mallory supersedes
Bayer, and its command cannot be avoided by expanding the rule of an earlier
case."
23
The strongest precedent for the Killough result, the first Jackson v. United
States24 opinion, held a postarraignment confession unacceptable in that "Jack-
son's signing of the document cannot in any way be considered an independent act
based upon proper counsel or as occurring after time for deliberate reflection."
25
But on a second appeal, after a new trial, the confession was allowed on a finding
that the accused had indeed been duly warned by a judge and represented by
counsel, 26 the "time for deliberate reflection" factor apparently being minimized.
Two other decisions, uttered by the very same Killough court, passed upon
the same issue. In Goldsmith v. United, States,27 the admissibility of the reaffirma-
tion was predicated upon the fact that it occurred shortly after arraignment and
that the accused had legal counsel prior to it. The court in Naples v. United States2s
did not have to face the admissibility aspect of the reaffirmation squarely since
16 Lyons v. Oklahoma, supra note 14.
17 Id. at 603.
18 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Leyra v. Denno, supra note 14; Lyons
v. Oklahoma, supra note 14.
19 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
20 Id. at 540. See 72 YALE L.J. 1434, at 1442 (1963): "The impact of the Commission-
er's warning will be much weaker than it would have been absent a prior confession, for one
cannot be expected effectively to deny, even after repeated warnings, that which he has just
admitted."
21 315 F.2d 241, 244 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
22 Id. at 254.
23 Id. at 251.
24 Jackson v. United States, 273 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
25 Id. at 523.
26 Jackson v. United States, 285 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
27 Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
28 Naples v. United States, 307 F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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it was able to reverse the conviction on the basis of the initial confession. It did,
however, intimate that the follow-up confession had been procured in a deliberate
attempt to circumvent the Mallory rule.
If advice of counsel is to be taken as the decisive criterion, it is true, as the
majority contends, that the Killough decision is not inconsistent with either the
second Jackson opinion or Goldsmith, for both Jackson and Goldsmith had the
aid of counsel, while Killough did not. But the treatment of the deliberation-time
factor is not quite so uniform. While the majority finds support for the Killough
result in -the fact that the accused had such little time for deliberation between
arraignment and reaffimation, (and distinguishes Bayer primarily because in that
case the time lapse was so much longer!), it fails directly to meet the point that
both Goldsmith and Jackson based admissibility, in part at least, precisely on the
fact that the second confessions occurred so shortly after arraignment when the
magistrate's warnings were still ringing in the accuseds' ears.
Certainly the rationale behind the exclusion of Killough-type reaffirmations
can be no stronger than, nor very different from, that underlying the Mallory
rule itself, but, even at this late date, the justification for the latter is still not
altogether clear. The judicial opinions and legal comments, taken together, sug-
gest not a specific raison d'9tre, but a curious interplay of purposes.
First of all, clearly, the desire to avoid receiving involuntary confessions played
a significant role. Indeed, it cannot be denied that the automatic rule which Mallory
purports to wring from the McNabb opinion is actually a violent restatement of the
McNabb teaching, if a restatement at all. The deliberately vague 9 McNabb ruling
was initially thought by many to have said little more than that a prolonged de-
tention was to be but an added consideration in passing on a confession's volun-
tariness.3
0
The precise basis of the McNabb majority opinion was difficult to deter-
mine, because it recited facts about lack of schooling and worldly experience
on defendants' part, uncomfortable conditions of their confinement, pro-
longed questioning, lack of legal advice, etc.3 1
The critical question left by McNabb as to whether delay in itself was reason
enough for exclusion s2 was answered in the affirmative by Upshaw's explanation
that McNabb was not a mere extension of the involuntariness doctrine.33 But all
three opinions, McNabb, Upshaw and Mallory, emphasize the important role
extended detention might play in eliciting coerced confessions, 4 and the realization
that third-degree practices are common even today s is undoubtably an important
block in the rule's foundation. In any event, the idea has survived3 6 that the main
difference between a coerced confession and a Mallory-prohibited one is that the
coercion in the latter is presumed.
Secondly is the view, perhaps the most popular, that the Mallory rule was
designed as a sanction imposed on law enforcement officers for violation of Rule
5(a) 37 the belief that only by rendering the fruits of police illegality useless can
that rule be effectively enforced. The Supreme Court has denied the use of exclusion
29 Hogan and Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEO.
L.J. 1,,5 (1958).
30 Id. at 6.
31 MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 155, n.2 (1959).
32 MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 15, at 247.
33 Upshaw v. United States, supra note 7, at 412.
34 BEANEY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 211 (1955). See Reck v. Pate, 367
U.S. 433, 447 (1961): "Experience . . . teaches that confessions born of long detention under
conditions of stress, confusion and anxiety are extremely unreliable."
35 MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 15, at 229.
36 Hogan & Snee, supra note 29, at 28. See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 851 (Supp. 1962).
Professor Wigmore cites as a corollary to Upshaw that, nothing more appearing, it will be
assumed that such illegal detention was for the inducement of a confession.
37 Hogan & Snee, supra note 29, at 29.
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as a punitive measure against unrelated wrongdoing by the police. Our
duty in shaping rules of evidence relates to the propriety of admitting evi-
dence. This power is not to be used as an indirect mode of disciplining
misconduct.3 8
The Mallory decision, however, listed the inadmissibility rule as a means "ade-
quately to enforce the congressional requirement of prompt arraignment." ' This
was reiterated by the Killough majority in its statement that "the exclusionary rules
are the only effective deterrent to police wrongdoing."4 0 Whether one agrees that
the foregoing is a valid purpose will depend, of course, on where he feels the
line should be drawn to maintain that precarious balance between the individual's
rights and the efficient protection of society, a balance which, argues the dissenter,
is upset by Killough.4 1 The danger is such that any prospective enlargement of
protection for the accused must be sharply and critically examined, for
[W]e sometimes tend to forget that every extension of the rights of the
individual in the criminal field must necessarily and proportionately diminish
the ability of society as a whole to protect itself against the criminal.
42
The feeling remains strong that the automatic exclusion called for by Mallory is
too dear a price to pay for police discipline.
43
A third proffered rationale attributes the rules of exclusion to a judicial de-
sire to protect "the citizen against the violation of his privileges of immunity from
bodily manhandling by the police, and from the other undue . . .pressures . . .
of the third degree." 44 This view occupies a sort of middle-ground between the
first two in that, while relying wholly on neither voluntariness nor police discipline,
it does suggest both these elements insofar as the protection of these privileges
must in part be to prevent coercion and such protection presupposes the means to
preclude police violations. While all three rationales present a difference in em-
phasis rather than in kind, the third comes closest to McNabb's concern for
"maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence." 45 Adherents of all
three views should agree, however, with the statement that the rule prevents the
appearance of court complicity by refusing to allow government illegality to "debase
the processes of justice." 46
The Killough holding, it must be remembered, is hardly as automatic as that
of Mallory. While Mallory excludes all confessions obtained during a period of
illegal detention, Killough does not do the same for reaffirmations of such con-
fessions. Two factors are indispensable: 1) a lack of counsel, 4 7 and 2) an in-
sufficient time lapse between the two confessions to override the presumption that
the second was the fruit of the first.48 The former circumstance clearly weighed
the heavier, and its presence in the Killough case was "decisive, '49 although lack
of counsel before"° or after5 1 arraignment has been held not to be a violation of
38 United States v. Mitchell, supra note 10, at 70-71.
39 Mallory v. United States, supra note 1, at 453.
40 315 F.2d 241, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
41 Id. at 260 (dissenting opinion).
42 McGarr, The Exclusionary Rule: An Ill-Conceived and Ineffective Remedy, in POLICE
POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 100 (Sowle ed. 1962).
43 See 3 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 851 (3d ed. 1940):
But, it is argued, there are abuses by the police. Very true - here and
there, at least. It does not follow, however, that a stricter rule of exclusion
for confessions is the proper remedy .... The first remedy is to improve
police personnel. The second one is to provide a means of speedy confession
which shall be less susceptible to abuses, while still taking advantage of the
inherent psychological situation.
44 MAouRE, op. cit. supra note 31, at 229.
45 McNabb v. United States, supra note 4, at 341.
46 Hogan & Snee, supra note 29, at 32.
47 See 315 F.2d 241, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
48 See 315 F.2d 241, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
49 31 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 859 (1963).
50 Cicenia v. Lagay, supra note 14; Crooker v. California, supra note 14; Ashdown v. Utah,
supra note 14.
51 United States v. Moore, 290 F.2d 436, 439 (2d Cir. 1961).
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due process. But strong dissents have called for the presence of counsel at all stages
of interrogation, 52 in spite of the persistent claim that such a procedure would
cripple police investigation. The counsel issue is thus but another aspect of the
dialogue concerning the maintenance of that "precarious balance" already men-
tioned.
This presents a real dilemma in a free society. To subject one without
counsel to questioning ... is a real peril to individual freedom. To bring
in a lawyer means a real peril to solution of the crime, because . . . any
lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no
statement to police under any circumstances.
53
Regardless of whether due process requires pre-trial counsel, 54 however, it seems
clear that the Killough majority consider legal representation an important com-
ponent of civilized procedural standards, since absence of counsel in Killough
was the only substantial factual difference from Goldsmith and Jackson.
Because the time lapses between confession and reaffirmation in these three
cases were so similar, however, it is arguable that the significance of that element
was merely supplementary to the counsel issue, and was emphasized by the Killough
court only to reinforce a conclusion already assured by the latter.
Perhaps the most disconcerting element in Killough is that, despite its obvious
dependence upon these two factual circumstances, the court is reluctant to concede
Killough's applicability to any situation not identical with or at least closely parallel
to the situation before it.
[NMowhere have we said that a posthearing confession, following one
illegally procured before the hearing, must necessarily await the entry of
counsel; nor do we predetermine that the passage of no amount of time
could remove the taint of a confession obtained in defiance of the exclu-
sionary rule.55
With such a guardrail qualification, then, the opinion sets the stage for an ad hoc
determination of reaffirmance situations. After setting out these two factors as the
hinges of inadmissibility, it withholds sufficient clarifying lubrication to enable the
courtroom door to slam shut on such reaffirmations with authority and uniformity.
It is, of course, too early to assess Killough's impact. Despite its hedging, how-
ever, the footings have been laid, and it is likely that its mandate will be extended
rather than restricted. In United States v. Smith,58 the sole instance of a Killough
situation to date, the trial court for the District of Columbia, in one short paragraph,
refused to admit in a prosecution for murder the oral reaffirmations of a confession
obtained in defiance of Rule 5(a), holding that there was not present between the
two "either a sufficient lapse of time, or the meaningful advice of counsel ...
There was in short, no event ... sufficiently decisive to erase the effects of the first
confession." 57 The indication seems to be that the courts will come to matter-of-
factly disallow reaffirnation when the two critical elements are found not present.
It has been said that future generations will be puzzled looking back upon a
system of criminal procedure which will not permit a single question to be asked
of a defendant at his trial without his consent yet tolerates the most one-sided
struggle during the pre-trial interrogation. " Professor Wigmore has suggested that
the interrogating be carried on by a skilled magistrate, as is done in other "civilized
countries."59 For the present, the Killough reasoning strikes one as both a desirable
52 E.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, supra note 18 (dissenting opinion); Crooker v. California,
supra note 14, at 447 (dissenting opinion): "He has the right to receive the benefit of the
advice of his own counsel at the trial.... That same right should extend to the pre-trial stage."
53 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949).
54 BEAN.Y, op. cit. supra note 34, at 211: "To attack a coerced statement or confession
effectively, counsel must appear earlier than he does at present."
55 315 F.2d 241, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
56 United States v. Smith, 31 F.R.D. 553 (D.D.C. 1962).
57 Id. at 561.
58 Hogan & Snee, supra note 29, at 25-26.
59 3 Wios OE, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 851.
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and necessary corollary to the Mallory rule, for the right which it and Rule 5(a)




LABOR RELATIONS - UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES - UNION PICKETING TO FORCE
EMIPLOYER'S ACCEPTANCE OF "HoT-CARGO" CLAUSE NOT UNLAWFUL IN CONSTRUC-
TION INDUSTRY, BUT EMPLOYER MAY BREACH CLAUSE WITH IMPUNITY. - In a
recent circuit court case, Local 383 had picketed the general contractor to secure
a collective bargaining agreement which contained a "hot-cargo" clause providing
that any subcontracted construction work would be made subject to the terms of
the agreement. There were existing subcontracts with nonunion subcontractors.
On petition for review of a National Labor Relations Board order to cease and
desist from engaging in picketing found unlawful under section 8(b) (4) (A) -(B),1
it was held: order reversed, case remanded for dismissal. Picketing by a construction
union against a general contractor to secure an agreement to cease doing business
with certain persons is not unlawful, since the construction-industry proviso of section
8 (e),2 and section 8 (b) (4) (A), authorize use of coercion to secure such agreements,
and section 8(b) (4) (B) only proscribes coercion to enforce them. Construction
Laborers Local 383 v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963).
In a recent district court case, Local 48 sued the Hardy Corporation for alleged
violation of a "hot-cargo" provision voluntarily and legally entered into by'the parties
under the construction-industry proviso of section 8(e), seeking enforcement of
the provision and damages for its breach. No picketing or work stoppages had been
induced by the union. Held: specific enforcement by the court, or an award in
damages for the breach, would be "coercion or restraint" violative of section 8(b)
(4) (ii) (B) ; the provision may be "enforced" only by voluntary compliance of the
employer, without union conduct prohibited by section 8(b) (4). Local 48, Sheet
Metal Workers v. Hardy Corporation, 218 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ala. 1963).
A "hot-cargo" clause may be best described in terms of section 8(e) of the
60 12 CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 55, 57 (1963).
1 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b) (4) (A)-(B), 73 Stat. 542
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1963), amending 61 Stat. 141 (1947), which
makes it an unfair labor practice for
a labor organization or its agents -
(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage ... a strike or a refusal
... to use . . . or otherwise . . . handle or work on any goods, . . . or to
perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person
.... where in either case an object thereof is - (A) forcing or requiring
any employer ... to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by section
8(e) ; (B) forcing or requiring any person . .. to cease doing business with
any other person ....
2 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(e), 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29
U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. IV 1963), which provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any
employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, where-
by such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from
handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the prod-
ucts of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person,
and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter contain-
ing such an agreement shall be to such .extent unenforceable and void:
Provided, That nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement
between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry
relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site
of the construction . . . or other works: Provided further, That for the
purposes of this subsection (e) and section 8(b) (4) (B) the terms ... shall
not include persons . . . in the apparel and clothing industry: Provided
further, That nothing in this Act shall prohibit the enforcement of any
agreement which is within the foregoing exception.
